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MARTIAL LAW AND THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.

t
.THI~

AC'tS·OF :r9r4.-"MAR'.L'IAL LAw AND SoM~HING
Moru;;."-TRAD1T10:Ns oF THE: CONSTITUTION.

EM:eRGENCY

AUGUST 7th, I9I4, three days after Great Britain had de0 ·. Nclared
war, a momentous statute, called the
REALM ACT, was passed through the House of Comtnons

D~NCE CJJJ THE:

1

with lightning speed, without a· word of protest, in that spirit of
decision and confidence which has marked the war measures of this
Parliament.
The bill provided that "His Majesty has power during the continuance of the present war to issue Regulations as to the powers
and duties of the Admiralty and Army Council and other persons
acting in his bebalf, for securing the public safety and defence of .
the realm." "The public safety and defence of the re~lm,"-tbJs is
the warrant and sanction for all that is to follow: By this bill the
King in Council-which in effect means the Cabinet, or an inner
circle of the Cabinet2-might order the trial by courts-martial and
punishment of persons contravening the regulations "in iike manner
as if such. persons were subject to military law and had in active
service committed an offence" under one of the sections of
.the Army Act. The regulations for a breach of which such trial
might be had and such punishment inflicted were provided for in
broad terms. They might be regulations not only to secure the
safety of means of communication, or of railways, docks or harbors,
but as well regulations "to prevent persons communicating with the
enemy or obtaining information for that purpose or any purpose
calculated to jeopardize the success of the military forces," "or to
assist the enemy."
1 4 and
~See

s

Geo. V. c. 29. Aug. 8th, 19:£4-

Sidiiey Low in North American Review. July, 1916. 822, 825,_827.
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The Secretary for the Home Department, Mr. McKENNA, introduced the bill with as little ado and as little to say as though it
had been of the smallest consequence. He remarked that under
the terms of the bill punishment would not include the death sentence. Therefore--since the accused must needs survive the execution of the judgment of the court-martial-there would always_ be
an opportuni,ty of "considering" any action taken by the courtmartial. That apparently in his view disposed of all objections as
to the possible arbitrariness of the measure. His only other statement was that the House would readily understand that it was extremely desirable in case of tapping wires or attemp~s to• blow up
bridges that there should be an immediate court to consider the
o:ffence.3
•
The entire record of the proceedings which followed take up
hardly twenty lines in the Parliamentary Debates. Two questions·
were briefly asked and as briefly answered. Leave to introduce the
bill was promptly granted. The bill was read the first time and
ordered to be printed. Immediately Mr. McKENNA moyed that the
House resolve itself into a committee on the bill. The bill was
read a second time, reported without amendment, read the third
time and passed:' Superficially-but superficially only-such dispatch might be characterized by the words of Mr. WINDHAM when
in December, 18o4, the bill to re-establish martial law in Ireland
was introduced. "To vote the re-establishment of martial law," he
said, "seemed to be so much a matter of course that it ··required no
argument to support it. They stopped the constitution as a miller
would stop a wind or a water-mill, and with as little consideration."5
But on that occasion the debate was long and vigorous!
__

•Parliamentary Debates, Commons. LXV, col 2191.
'The proceedings following . Mr. McKenna's words asking leave to introduce the
bill are, in their entirety, as follows :
·
"Dr. Chapple: Will this bill be retrospective from the commencement of the war?
"Mr. McKenna: No, sir, it will date from the passing of the Act, and the Regu·
lations will last during the continuance of the war.
"Dr. Chapple: Will it apply to any offense which has already been committed?
"Mr. McKenna: No, it will only ·apply to offenses committed after the passing
of the Act.
"Qu.estion put and agreed to.
"Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. McKenna and the Attorney-General. Pre·
sented accordingly, read the first time and ·ordered to be printed. [Bill 358.]
"Bill read a second time.
"Mr. McKenna: I beg to move that this House will immediately resolve itself
into the Committee on the Bill.
"Bill read. a second time.
"Bill accordingly considered in committee; reported without amendment, read the
third time and passed." Parliamentary Debates, Commons, LXV, 219Mi193,
G Hansard's Debates, I, 1630.
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The next day the bill passed the House of Lords-with no discussion.6 Later -on Parliament was to recognize that its action had
been hurried but now there was no one ta object. Dispatch seemed
in the mood Qf every one. The great emergency must be faced
with decision, without wavering, with a might that ;,vould overwhelm every disloyal spirit and an authority that would strike the
note of discipline and obedience throughout the nation.
Two weeks later the Act was .made yet stronger. The power
of courts-martial to try and punish civilians was extended to offences
committed in ·violation of any Regulations which- might be made
"-to prevent the spread of reports likely to cause disaffection or
alarm," or those which should be mad~ to secure the safety of "any
area" proclaim~d by the Admiralty or Army Council to be an area
necessary to safeguard in the interests of the training or concentration of any of the forces. 7
·
The bill to effect these amendments was introduced by Mr. McKl;;N:&A on August 24th. He said, "It is now proposed to extend the
power of the military ~tithorities to all areas in which trade is
being carried on. The House ~ill see that it is very necessary and
desirable such an extension should be made." This was all that
he said, and there was no further consideration at this time.8 On
the motion for second reading of the bill, on August 26th, there was
indeed an interruption in the precipitate course of these measures.
Mr. TRJWELYAN felt that "the proposed words, authorizing trial by
court-martial and punishment of persons contraveµing regulations
designed "to prevent the spread of reports likely to cause disaffection ·
or alarm" were of "somewhat vague import." "There is some uncertainty felt,'' he said, "as to whether these words, taken in connection with the Bill in general and the Regulations to be issued,
may not be capable of being interpreted by military authorities to
prevent the expression in speech or in writing of any political
opinions on the actions of the government." ·But Mr. McKENNA
assured him that the new words would n~t be used for such -pur.poses.11
•The whole of the report in Parliamentary.Debates, Lords, Vol XVII, Aug. 8, 1914,
reads: "Defense of the Realm Bill. Brought from the Commons; read Ia and to be
printed; then (Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended) Bill read 2a (the
Lord Chancellor); committee negatived: Bill read 3a, and passed. (No. 253.)"
'4 and s Geo. V, c. 63, in Parliamentary Debates, Commons, I.XVI, 26.
• See Parlimentary Debates, Commons,' I.XVI, 26.
•And then he gave an illustration of the purpose of the amending bill, in this reo
gard: "I do not think my hon. Friend can have failed to observe the case of the
man ;.,ho was prosecuted for stating that the Black Watch had been cut up and thci
wounded brought back to this country. That man was convicted not of the offense oa
publishing that most untrue statement, but because he was wearing a military uniform
which he was not entitled to wear. It is most desirable that the spruding of false
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Without any further debate the bilf was the same day passed
through its various stages in the Commons. In the House of Lords
on the following day, August 27th, the bill was passed through
all its stages without any debate, and with only a brief statement
of its object iby Viscount AI.LENI>ALE, who explained that "these
emergency measures were hurriedly drawn, with the result that
certain omissions took place."
In November the emergency legislation was revised.10 It was
made not only more effective11 but more drastic. .The death penalty,
though it was contrary to the original purpose as stated by Mr. McKENNA in his outline of August 7th, was authorized whenever it
should be proved that the offence was "committed with the intention of assisting the enemy." The government in August had
sought to enlist support by expressly excluding the death penalty.
In November its mind had changed, and perhaps nothing reveals the
determined support with which the government was meeting in these
measures more than the fact that in the House of Commons this
provision was passed without a word of dissent. Yet it was a sensational measure, the first time in England for at least two hundred
and fifty years when the power to sentence a civilian to death without trial by jury had been given a legal sanction.12 Only in· the ·
reports of that kind, which may cause disaffection and do cause alarm, should be
punished, and it is obvious that it is only false reports of that kind which it is P.ere
proposed to make punishable." Parliamentary Debates, Commons, !,XVI, 87, 88, 89.
10 5 Geo. V, c. 8.
u There were changes, some of which perhaps were of first importance from the
legal standpoint. Thus the enacting words of the first Defence of the Realm Act were
somewhat equivocal; it was doubted whether power was conferred upon tlie King in
Council to make regulations for the defence of the realm and the public safety inde·
pendently of its regulations as to the powers of the military anq naval authorities. But
this uncertainty was removed by the enacting words of the Defence of the Realm Con·
solidation Act of Nov. 27th, 1914- See the' two acts and see Baty & Morgan; War,. Its
Conduct and Legal Results, 102-10412 "Thus for the first time in England for at least two hundred and fifty years, a
civilian may be sentenced to death without trial by jury. Is this justified? Is it
necessary? It may be said (and• we have said it) that the offence of assisting the enemy
is already treason at common law and punishable as such with the death penalty. So
it is and so it ought to be. But it is one thing to try a man for an offence
defined by the common law and by innumerable cases in the law reports and to try
him with all the safeguards of a jury and with the right to appeal from their verdict,
if it is one of 'guilty' to the Court of Criminal Appeal; it is quite another thing to
try him for an offence which is not so defined, and to try him by a court of officers
ignorant of the common law, who direct themselves, instead of directing a jury, both
as to the law and the facts, 'and whose verdict and sentence in one are. subject to no
appeal but merely to the revision of a ministerial officer-the Judge-Advocate. Con·
sidering that the king's courts are still sitting, that the king's writ runs throughout
the realm, and that juries can be, and are being, empaneled every day, we think that
this subjection of the lives of private citizens to military law is entirely unjustified. The
death penalty once inflicted, is irrevocable." Bati & Morgan: \Var, Its Conduct and
I,egal Results, no.
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Ho).lse of Lords was there protest, and there it met with weighty
opposition. Lord HAr.sBU.RY, Lord LoREBURN and Lord BRYCE
united against it.
It was in ~act more .than two hundred and fifty years since Hor;l30RNE: had declared, with oracular force, th~t "The Common Law is
the 'common reliever of persons wronged. * * * The ordinary way
of Trial for Life is by Indictment and a Jury; when therefore this
may be done, and that the sheriff with the ·Posse Comitat).15, is
. able to keep the peace, it cannot be done by martial law, or by judgment of the king. and peers in parliament without indictment as was
·· adjudged in the case of the Earl of MARCH. * * * My lords, the
reason of this maxim of law is, as I conceive, these actions extra.ordinary are done extra ordinem, and done only in. times of necessity
when ·we are not tied to any rules of law, and therefore not to be
brought into example, nor have any warrant but only that of
necessity."18 ·
There was no further amendment until Mardi of the following
year, when, as we shall see, a most important change was made.
Throµghout the seven months, .from early August on, the approval
with which the emergency legislation seemed to be received in
Parliament was apparently reflected in the country at large. Of
public· clamor against it there appears to have been none .that was
of any moment; of expert criticism there had been nut little. Parliament in this action seemed more than the council of wise men of
the nation. It seemed to be speaking in assertion of the primal
instincts of the people, inexorably. If. this was not wholly the case,
if the government in any degree yielded to the always present temptation of such occasions, its matter-of-fact, almost droning doing
of' the businessiwas a perfect disguise. It showed nothing of that
love for the display of power, the passion "to stand revealed, as it
were, in the storm and· thunder-bolt" of which HALI.AM writes.H
And if there was some blind confidence at the time in what the
government was doing, this confidence seems to have been approved.
There has been time and outlet fot recrimination, but the recrimination. up to the time of this writing had been almost wanting. The
people of Great Britain, it would seem, had put their seal of approval upon what was done by Parliament. This could not have
happened if Parliament had not acted with a true instinct for the
public welfare.
But the absence of public clamor is i:iot so surprising perhaps
u 3' St. Tr., 8:z6, 88r. For the judgment of .reversal in the cast of the Earl of
March see I Hale P. C. 347, 348. See also the case of the l!;arl of Lancaster, Ibid,
343•341·

.

u Hallam· Const. Hist. of :E;ng. I,

240.
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as the small amount of expert criticism that followed. Following
the Boer war and especially after the Marais case there was a great
deal of such criticism. But now in this incomparably greater case,
coming home to everyone in Great Britain, those especially qualified
to speak were mostly silent.15 This is not because there was no
basis for attack. Here was a precedent that might conceivably lead
to the undermining of all the "monuments" of English liberty. Much
is made of this in the one outstanding early criticism of the law.
The words of J. H. MORGAN, Professor of Constitutional Law. at
University College, London-a man who later was engaged in official duties in France with the British forces-set the matter forth in
a bold light. In his treatise on "War, Its Conduct and Legal Results,'' which was published early in I9IS, he declares that this legislation establishes "martial law and something more" ; while it is more
specious it is far less restricted than martial law. Never in English history, he asserts, has the Executive assumed such arbitrary
power over life, liberty, and property of British subjects. ·He sees
in the Acts and the resulting Regulations a "net of restrictions so
finely woven, so ingeniously designed, that it enmeshes every act
of the citizen,'' establishes arrest without warrant ;16 a right .without
warrant to enter any house by day or by night; a power to deport
the whole population of any town or village from one part of the
country to another, to punish by court-martial with penal servitude
for life, to force incriminating evidence. The private citizen is
placed under the absolute orders of any major holding the King's
comm~ssion. ''We must leave the. reader to judge for himself,'' he
concluaes, "whether this 'Parliamentary despotism,' which recalls
nothing so much as the kind of legislation hitherto exclusively reserved for uncivilized Protectorates, is either necessary or wise."17
But there seemed few to echo him and the credit for the limitations subsequently placed upon this emergency programme seems to
belong almost entirely to the spontaneous purpose of the ministry
itself.18 The later debates seem to bear evidence that even in the
house of its friends there had been anxious questioning and mutterings of dissent.
15 The striking lack of comment will be observed by any one who examines the
periodical indexes from August, 1914, onward.
15 The effect of this is illustrated by a case cited in the House of Commons on
March 2, 1915. A Scottish skipper had had the misfortune, in November, to run into
a British submarine in port. The skipper and all of his crew were imprisoned for about
two weeks and when released no charge had been framed against them. See the Annual
Register, 1915·, p. 79, London Times, March 3, 1915.
1 T Baty & Morgan: War, Its Conduct and Legal Results, n:z, n3 .
.. It is possible that Professor Morgan's book, standing almost alone though it
did, had its effect on the government. It is interesting to note that the book is dedi·
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II.
AM~ING THE ACTS.-COUR'tS-MAR'tIAI, IN ~E:RVE FOR BRITISH
.SUBJECTS;. IN USE FOR THOS~ NOT BRITISH SUBJECTs.

In February of 1915 most important changes were made with a
certain ease of debate and some self-revelation. by the members of
Parliament participating. A bill so amending the Defence of the
Realm Act as to give civil offenders a right to trial by the civil
courts was introduced and in March it became law.19 The amendment however was made subject to a most important qualification.
In the event of "invasion or other special mili~ry emergency" arising out of the war, the "King could by proclamation forthwith suspend the Act, martial law would at once be reinstated and the
civilian be subjected to military authority and the military tribunals.
Perhaps nothing in present-day constitutional history will deserve
to be more frequently turned to than the brief remarks that were
made just before and during the consideration of this bill.
The. second reading of the bill in the House of Commons was
moved on February 24th, by Sir John SrnoN, the Attorney-General.
He explained the circumstances· under which the Defence of the
Realm Act of August 8th was adopted. Some will see in his speech
a measure of apology for the haste of that proceeding. Others will
find nothing of the kind. He did admit that the Act had been "rapid-·
ly" passed through Parliament. This he explained. Parliament had at
short notice to decide what was the tribunal which should promptly
enforce the necessary regulations, and the House agreed that the
graver class of offences under the Act should be dealt with by courtsmartial. He admitted that it was "an extremely novel proposal.''"But
he asserted that -the justification for it was "very plain." The first
duty of the House when the war broke out was to take "adequate and
effeCtive steps against a great national danger.-" And he of course
treated the Defence of the Realm Act as closely interwoven with the
emergency programme, of which the three bank holidays, the closing
of the stock exchange, the moratorium were other parts. The apologia concluded with the ·<teclaration that in view of the circumstances "the argum\!nt that the Defence of the Realm Act was novel
and violated constitutional tradition was of very little weight." But
it should be carefully noted that the spokesman of the government
did here confess that the Act was novel and that it did viplate constitutional traditions.
eated t~ Sir John Simon, who as Attorney General piloted the Defence of the Realm·
Amendment Act of March, 1915, through the House of Commons.
11 s Geo •. V, c. 28, March 16, 1915.

.
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In his next words he passed on to the new amendment. He said
that the time had now come for looking back to see whether the
provisions of the original act "had in any degree gone beyond what
was 'necessary"-a most notable admission. Such consideration, after
seven months' experience, he said, was "a matter of the greatest
importance for every one who cared for what was characteristic in
British institutions." Here was a confession, though the AttomeyGeneral did not put it in so many words, that the" Act had gone
beyond what was necessary. And the government was ready to
change it by giving British subjects, in ordiriary circumstances, the
right to trial by the civil courts. But the right should be limited to
them alone "for after all it was a: British tradition that the bill was
intended to maintain."20
Both in the discussion in committee of March 211d and in the
discussion on the third reading it was proposed that the provisions
for trial by jury should admit of abrogation only when the civil
courts were rendered unavailable. On the latter occasion Sir R
ADKINS moved an amendment to this end. He said that some members believed that the only time when martial law and courts-martial
without alternatives were defensible was when the civil courts could
not be used. He declared categorically that this had been an unbroken practice in every ki_nd of crisis, and on every occasion on
which Great Britain had been at war.21 !!'his amendment was seconded.
But the government was strongly opposed to such a change and
secured its defeat. The Attorney-General said that he deprecated
complacent comparisons with past crises. Let Parliament "be sure
they took adequate steps; they would be forgiven by posterity if
their steps were more than adequate"-words which, wittingly or
unwittingly, echoed those of LINCOI,N when, defending his action in
the Vallandingham arrest, he said: "I was slow to adopt the strong
measures which by degrees I have been forced to regard as being
within the exceptions of the constitution and as indispensable to
public safety. * * * I think the time not unlikely to come when I
shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than too
many." 22 But however that may be, the Attorney-General said he did
not understand how anybody who realized the real nature of the
probl.em the country had to face could think that it would be satisfactory to alter the clause in the way proposed. The right to use courtsmartial for the trial of civil offenders :in case of special emergency
I

""I,ondon Times, Feb. 25, 1915.
21 I,ondon Times, March 10th, 1916.
22 See Rhodes Hist. of the U. S., IV., 250.
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must be preserved for the government. But he "hoped and believed"
that they would never have to exerdse it. The government "must
have the power to take any step, however novel, however far it departed from our traditional or constitutional rights, if that step was, .
in the pinch of necessity, justified in order to protect the national interests. " 28
It was generally recognized in the debates on these measures
that Parliament was breaking with the old "customs" and "traditions." The favored word seems to have been tradition. No one
ventured to assert that such acts were "beyond the power of Par.. liament, or that they were unconstitutional in the sense that the
supremacy of Parliament dicl. not embrace the authority to enact
them. The Opposition seemed, if anything, more strongly convinced
than the Liberals that the government should have plenary au· •
thority. Mr. Bonar LAW on February r5th had declared bluntly
that ·"at a time like this powers of dictatorship must be given to the
government."2 ' Sir Edward CARSON, also of the Unionist Party,
and who was to succeed Sir John SIMON as Attorney-General, fully
supported the emergency measures. Agreeing that so long as the
regular courts were sitting they ought to be availed of as far as
possible, he thought it idle not to recognize that circumstances might
arise, "as no· doubt they did arise when the original bill was introduced," which would render it impossible entirely to adhere to all
the traditions ·of the constitution. "The government must have
whatever powers they asked for. A great war could not be carried
on without throwing full responsibility for everything upon the gov. ernment. They knew what they had to deal with, and their critics
did not." He believed that there was "reason for great congratulation ~n the fact that notwithstanding the demands of the war- the
government was able to come to the House and say: 'After seven
months of war we think less drastic legislation is necessary for the
detection and punishment of crime.' " 25
""London Times, March 10, 1915. Cf. Hansaxd's Debates, I, 1599, on the bill to
establish maitial law in Ireland. In his protest against that measure one of the members said that he "could not consent to violate the constitution, unless the necessity of
such violation .was clearly established" and that the bill would vest the government
with extraordinary and unconstitutional powers. See also pp. 1609-1651 passim.
" This remark was made in the course of his consideration of the powers of the
.Admiralty to dismiss for incompetence, "or even if they think they have a better man
to dismiss without giving any reason," powers which he believed it should have. To
the sentence quoted above in the text, he added: "But, with the best intentions,
dictators are apt to get to love their power, and one of the evils of dictatorship is secrecy.
Where it is necessary let us have it, but let us as fax as possible stick to the old
-custom." ·London Times, Feb. 16, 1915. f>_ee also the remaxks of the Marquis of
<:rewe and Eaxl Curzon on this subject. London Times, Jan. 8, 1915.
=London Times, Feb. 25, 1915,
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The debate in the House of Lords at this time might be characterized as somewhat less to the point than that in the House of
Commons, but here too the general agreement that these extraordinary powers were needful seems unmistakable. Lords on "both
sides were of this opinion, though perhaps in the Lords as w_ell as
the Commons the conservatives were ready to express themselvt:s
more strongly in the matter than the Liberals. Thus the Marquis
of LANSDOWNE, who in June, 1915, was to become a member of the
cabinet without portfolio, thought it unfortunate that the government should be obliged to recede from its earlier position. "It -was
no use disguising the fact that this bill was bound to be very much
less of a deterrent than the onginal bill." 26 On the other hand we
find Lord BRYCE consistently witl'i the position which he, Lord
HALSBURY and Lord Loru;;BURN had taken in November, expressing
the conviction that it would be much more to the satisfaction of the
whole public that courts-martial should be limited as proposed in
the bill. 27 The debate in the House of Lords was interesting but
the impression one gets is that it was far from spirited. N evertheless to some ~f "the members of tne upper house the credit may be
largely due for the amendment reinstating trial by Civil courts. In
the House of Commons, Mr. GOLDSTONE, a Labor member, had remarked that apparently it was to the Lords that the country owed
a vindication of trial by jury. 28 The House of Lords has played
an honorable part on more than one occasion in safeguarding these.
rights.
The gist of this emergency legislation, first as it stood at
the end of 1914, then as it was amended in March of 1915, is this:
By the Acts of 1914 the Executive was authorized in general terms
during the continuance of the war to issue regulations for securing
the public safety and the defence of the realm,29 and it was specifically given power by such regulations to authorize the trial and punishment by court-martial or in case of minor offences by courts of
summary jurisdiction, of persons committing offences against the
regulations. 3 ° For the purpose of the trial by court-martial "the
""London Times, March l:Z., 1915.
2T Ibid.
""The Annual Register, 1915, 74.. One of the judges of the Court of Appeal, Pickford, has given his judicial
opinion that sub-section l of the act "gives the widest possible power of making regu•
lations for the safety and defence of the realm and as to the powers and duties of the
Admiralty and Army Council and of the members of His Majesty's forces and other
persons active in his behalf." In re A Petition of Right [1915) 3 K. B. 663.
"°"And in particular against any of the provisions of such regulations designed to
prevent communication with the enemy or obtaining information for that purpose," etc.,
etc. For the detailed provisions see 5 Geo. V, c. S, § l. See also the Defence of the
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person may be proceeded against and dealt with as if he were a
pers.on subject to military law and had in active service committed
an offence under section five of the Army Act." Under such section
the highest punishment is imprisonment for life. But contrary to
the original purpose the death penalty was expressly provided for
in the revised legislation of November 27th, 1914.81 As affected by the
amendment of March 16th, 1915,s2 · this general scheme stood unimpaired so far as persons no~ British subjects are c~ncemed excepting that trial of such persons by the civil courts was made
optional at the will of the Executive, not however at the will of
the accused. British subjects are given a right to trial by the civ~
j:OUrts for offences against the regulations.ss But even"as to them in
case of invasion or other special emergency this right may be &Uspended, and trial by court-martial for offences under the regulations
be made general.
·

III.
E:NGI.AND AS LIMITED BY THE CoMMON LAw AND
, GREAT Ac:rs OR CHARttRs.
What then is the place i1i the history of· English constitutional
law of this great group of acts and rules? Does legislation which
first conferred upon the Executive power to make drastic regulations
circumscribing the rights and libertie5 of civilians and to proceed
against; try and punish those -committing offences against such acts
in the same way that soldiers in active service are; which, while it
later _ga~e to the British- subject a qualified exemption from the
latter power, retained it a·s to all others and prescribed that it might
again be called into full operation by the Executive whenever in its
opinion the special need for it existed-does such legislation signify
that Great Britain has broken with her past in some grave.manner,
or is it open to a different interpretation?
The ,Attorney General, Sir John SIMON, when he made his arguMAB.TIA!, LAW ·IN

Reatm (Consolidated) Regul:i_tions. The Act and the Regulations will be found in BatT
& Morgan: War, Its Conduct and Legal Results, 438, 439, and in Pulling: Manual of
~mergency Legislation, and supplements.
11 s Geo. V, c. 8.
12 s Geo. V, c. 28.
"The British sublect may claim the right to such trial within six clear days from
the time when the general nature of the charge is co=unicated to him. He is entitled
to notice in writing of the "general nature" of the charge as soon as pral:ticable after·
the arrest and a~ the same time notice in writing ot his rights under the act. Where
it is in. the interest of national safety the court on application of the prosecution may
exclude all or any portion of the public from trial, but the sentence must be passed
in public. See s Geo. V.,· c. 34- No change was made by this amendment as to
-offences triable before a court of summary jurisdiction, the purpose of the amendment
being to change the law as to trial by court martial only. See the speech of Sir John
Simon in the House of Commons, Feb. 24, I915. London Times, Feb. 25, I915.
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ment on the second reading .of the Defence of the Realm amendment bill conceded, as we have seen, that all of this legislation was
highly novel and ~at it involved a breach of the "traditions" of the
British constitution. Others made the same admission.
'
In the Constitution of the United States we have come to distinguish between the written constitution and the unwritten constitution. The former is "law," the latter-as illustrated for example by the doctrine that no man shall be President of the United
States for more than two terms-may be termed "c!Jstom." .
The English Constitution is not written, yet even in it some such
distinction between law and custom may be made. The rules and
principles that compose it-while they may be manifested by documents, such great documents as the Great Charter or the Petition of
Right-are those expressions of political experience of the state
which have come to be regarded as fundamental. Some of these rules
have been in their origin statutes; some have had the character of
compact; some have taken form out of the thin air of use and wont.
Often they may be spoken of as "traditions." Yet many "of them,
the more fundamental ones, those which go to the organic constitution of the government and which fix the rights and privileges of
the individual in the state and under the government, are in the
highest sense "law," "constitutional law." 34 When Parliament, supreme as it is, changes that law it changes the constitution. A lead.ing writer on English constitutional law states what none would
challenge, when he says that "the right ·to individual freedom
is part of the constitution because it is inh_erent in the ordinary law
of the land [as distinguished from the systems in which right is .
guaranteed by a written constitution]," and he adds that "the right
is one which can hardly be destroyed without a thorough !evolution
in the constitution and manners of the nation."35
Perhaps no more ready way of coming at the heart of the matter
will be found than that of asking to what extent the regime of
"martial law and something more" which was inaugurated by this
legislation would have been legal if this almost omnibus authority
had not .been forthcoming. Under certain circumstances and conditions martial law, arbitrary measures, drastic executive acts are
not only necessary but are regarded as legal,88 and these ~rcum"'See, for example. the treatment of constitutional law in Dicey, Law of theConst., 7th ed., 22 et seq. And see Lowell, The Government of England, new ed., I, 9.
so Dicey, Law of the Const., 7th ed., 197·
""Case of Shipmoney (1{i37) 3 St. Tr. 826, 976, 1162; R. v. Nelson & Brand (1867),.
Cockburn's Report, 85; Stephen, History of Criminal Law, I, ::us; Dicey, Law of theConstitution, 7.th ed., 270; EdinbUigh Review, January, t902, 84; Juridical Review~
26-213.
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stances afford an ample defence in any suit against the one who does
these acts. Yet in a sense martial law is not law at all.37 It is not the
administration of law, but the assumption of absolute power.
As to the circumstances warranting such arbitrary measures,
and as to the measures thus warranted there is a difference of opinion
, --often vexatious enough. But even so there is an approach to a
measurable concensus of opinion, while those who take extreme
positions almost always acknowledge some limitq.tions.
It is generally agreed that when the country is invaded, or wlien
a state of war, or-what for this purpose is regarded as amounting
to the same thiqg-a serious condition of riot, insurrection or rebellion exists,38 . the Crown and its officers, that is to say the government, may use the amount of force necessary in the circumstances
,to restore order, or t~ secure the public safety and defence of the
realm.89 .
.
·
"Martial law cannot be said in strictness to supersede the ordinary tribu!U!-ls, inasmuch as i.t only exists by reason of those tri.bunals having been practically sµperseded,''~ or at, least by reason
of a necessity so real that so~e of the ordinary processes of civil
government ~e perforce susp_ended.'1 Suspension of the civil courts
is not the only test. It .seems that according to the weight of authority
martial law may exist even when the courts' are open.'2

.

.
.
R, v. Nelson and Brand, Cockburn's Report, 85 et ~; W. S. Holdsworth in
• I.aw Quarterly Review, XVIII, I27, I218.
• "Making insurrection in order to redress grievances, real or pretended," said
Lord Mansfield, "is levying war within the realm, and · against the Kiog," and he
gives numerous other illitstratious of "levying war within the realm." I2I Cobbett's PilrL
Hist., 694.
•See the argument by Holborne in Case of Shipmoney (I631), 3 Howell's St. Tr.
'826, at 88I, 976. "Royal power, I account, is to be used in case of necessity, ani!
imminent diinger • * * as in cases of rebellion, sudden invasion and some other
cases, where martial law may be used, and may not stay for legal proceedings. But
i11 time of peace, and of no extreme necessity• legal courses must be used and nol:
royal power," per Croke, J:, Ibid, at n62; see also Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on
Cons. Law, I98, I99, 20I'; Kent, Comm. II, 341n.
·
"'Joint opinion of Attorney and Solicitor General Sir John Campbell and Sir
R. :M. Ro1£e as to the power of the Governor of Canada to proclaim martial law, Jan.
I6, I838. Forsyth, op. cit. I99. "When martial law is proclaimed under circumstances
of assumed necessity, the proclamation must be regarded as. the statement .of an existing
fact, rather than the legal -<:reation of that fact," Cushing, Attorney General of the
United States, 8 Opinions of Attorneys General 365, 374. "Martial law • * • is founded
on paramount necessity." Kent, Comm. II, 341n.
'1 "-.It has been usual for all governments, during an actual rebellion, to proclaim
martial law or the suspension of civil jurisdiction." Hallam, Const. Hist, 7th ed.,I, 240.
"Marais v. The General Officer [1902] A. C. I09; Elphinstone v. Bedreechund (1830),
2 St. Tr. N. S. 379; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 121, minority opinion. "As to Ex
parte D. F. Marais, the only point it really decided, in my opinion, was that th.e
absence of visible disorder and the continued sitting of the courts are not conclusive
evidence of a state of peace," Sir Frederick Pollock, !,aw Quart. Rev., XVIII, I57·
"The fact that the courts are open and undisturbed will in all cases fiimish a powerful
If
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As. to the source of this power there has been much dispute. On
the one hand it has been maintained that the power is a prerogative
of the Crown, on the other that it is found in the common law ijght
and duty of all, subject as well as ruler, to use as much force as may
be necessary to deal with the situation.48 Very recently the courts
have pronounced upon important phases of the question. In July,
i:9I5, on an appeal from the Kin~s Bench Division to the Court of
Appeal on a petition of right,44 it was held, affirming the decision in
the King's Bench, that elements of this power exist as a prerogative
of the Crown. The immediate question was whether the Crown represented by the competent military a.i:td naval authorities has power
iri time of war to take possession of and occupy any lands or premises for the purpose of the defence of, the realm without making
compensation therefor to the owner. It was held that the Crown
has such power.
One of the judges, WARRINGTON, said: "It cann9t, I think, be
disputed, and the suppliants do not in fact dispute, that the King,
as the supreme executive authority, was and is now by virtue of this
prerogative entitled in certain circumstances of national emergency
to take and use the property of a subject or otherwise interfere with
private rights in order to provide for the safety of the public and
defence of the realm~" And Coz:r:Ns-HARDY, Master of the RolJs,
declared that "the prerogative applies to what. is reasonably necessary for preventing and repelling invasion at the present time, regard ·
·being had to the invention of gunpowder and the use of aeroplanes
presumption that thci:e is no necessity for a resort to martial law, but it should not
furnish an irrebuttable presumption," Willoughby ,on the Constitution, x25x. "When
the courts are sitting it is no doubt a time of peace-but, subject to the qualification
established by these two cases [Marais v. The General Officer, supra, and Elphinstone v.
Bedreechund, supra], that they are sitting in their own right and not merely as
licensees of the military power," W. S. lroldsworth, Law Quart. Rev. XVIII, x:;o.
As to the latter point, the relation of the military to tlie civil power where martial law
is proclaimed, see Willoughby, op. cit., x229, 1230.
a Not every exertion of force to repel force is martial law. Where for instance
officers of the law or private individuals interfere to prevent the commission of a
felony though they repel force with force, they exercise not martial law, but a common law
right which has a recognized place in . the ordinary civil law as has the law of arrest
to which it is closely related. But when the force is used to overcome a real danger
to the state which takes the form of "actual war or of insurrection, riot or re·
bellion amounting to war," it may .become martial law. By many English authorities
such force whether employed by a civilian or the military arm, has been called martial
law. Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on Const. Law, 19S; Sir Frederick Pollock, in Law
Quart. Rev. XVIII, 153. Generally-and especially by American authorities-it is agreed
that when on such an occasion the military arm is called ill to aid the civil martial
law exists. See Willoughby on the Const. II, 122S; Chase, C. J., in ex parte Milligan,
4' WalL 127; Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents II, 1244, 1274; Stephen; Hist.
of Crim. Law I, 211, 21s.; Opinions of the Attorney General VIII, 374" [1915], 3 K. B. 64g.
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in warfare." 4 ~ These decisions would seem to make the more extreme contentions against the prerogative no longer tenable if they
were ever so.46 Subject no- doubt to most important limitations,
clearly implied in the foregoing quotations, there is a prerogative right. On the other hand, while it is doubtless to be
understood that the things which the government .may do
in exercise of the prerogative may for obvious reasons vary in
nature or degree from those which a private individual may do in
case of national emergency (here there is real concrete difference of
which much more may be made in the future), they do not remove
the uncertainty as to the legal identification in source of the emergency powers of ruler and subject.47 As Coz:i;;NS-liARDY declares in
this case "the prerogative is a part of the common law." Does the
subject then participate in the prerogative? Is his right, let us say,
to go on private property and dig trenches, a portion of the King's
prerogative subsisting in the hands of a subject?-what BLACKSTONE
defines a franchise to be. Or is the prerogative merely a portion of
the general common law rights subsisting in the hands of the government ?4 8 Or are the general and the prerogative rights in this matter
different common lalrights ?4°·
"'And in the King's Bench Division it was said: "In support of his argument
that thb'prerogative can lawfully only be exercised in the event of actual invasion, Mr.
I.eslie Scott relies upon the words in the Saltpetre case [12 Co. 12], 'when enemies
come against the realm to the sea-coast,' and upon the words. 'or unless the enemy
shall have actually invaded the United Kingdom at the time when such lands shall
nave been so taken,' in § 23 of the Act, 5 & 6 Viet., c. 94- If this be a limitation on the
exercise of the prerogative, I think the changed condition of modern warfare must
lie taken into account, and the realm now requires protection from enemy aircraft and
Iong:range guns of enemy ships as in the old days it required protection from the 'landing
of enemy troops. Moreover when possession was taken of the lands and premises in
qpestion there had been an actual bombardment of the coast by ships of the enemy,''
[1915] 3 K. B. 65.21. See also Cozens-Hardy's and Warrington's opinions tci the same
.effect, 658, 659, 666. Cf. the opinion of Pickford, L. J., 66.;.
"It .may affect even the measured opposition of such a writer as Dicey. See his
I.aw of the Constitution, 7th Ed., 549. Dicey's position seems to be that the prerogative
right, such as it is, cannot be regarded as a thing separate and apart from the general
·nght. .
.
•r An uncertainty which finds expression even in the most recent works. Thus in
:the article on Constitutional Law in Halsbury's 'the I.aws of England, published in
:1909, we find: "Whether this power [to use force, that is declare martial law], iS
-really a prerogative of the Crown, or whether it is an example of the common law
right and duty of all-rui'er and subject alike-to use the amount of force necessary to
suppress disorder-is not quite free from doubt." Vol 6, p. 403, and citations. See
.also Holbome's argument in 3 St. Tr. 395, and Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 539;
here, as in most if not all of the judicial decisions in the matter, the prerogative right
.and the common right are closely identified.
"In the opinion by the King's Bench Division-whose reasoning Cozens-Hardy, on
.appeal to the Court of Appeal, declared that he had substantially reproduced-it was
said (by Avozy, J.), that the "authorities appear to establish that by the Constitution
ihe defence of the realm is entrusted to the Crown, that the law has entrusted
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But the practical consequences of the identification in source of
these powers, or the lack of .such identification, seems slight.50 In
either case the powers that may be invoked are limited by the n~ces
sity of the case. All excepting some of those who uphold the theory
of immunity of an officer in time of war51 agree that the power is
limited to what is necessary. But they disagree as to the kind or.
d.egree of necessity which will act as a justification.
The tendency to champion the principle that only that may be
9one which is "in strictness necessary"-"the doc.tril1:e," as it has
been called, "of immediate necessity"_:_is a notable one. It has the
support of numbers of the ablest judges and students of this subject.
Then there are those who occupy a sort of middle ground. 52 And
finally the view that "necessity" means little more than what appears
the person of His Majesty with the care of this. defence, that in this business of defence
the suprema potestas is inherent in His Majesty as part of his Crown :Ind kingly
dignity, that in times of war or invasion the maxim salus populi suprema lex must
prevail, and that in these times of war not only His Majesty but likewise every man
that hath power in his hands, may talce the goods of any within the realm, pull down
their houses or burn their corn to cut off victuals from the enemy, and do all other
things that conduce to the safety of the kingdom without respect had to any man'.!I
property.'' [1915] 3 K. B. 651. These words echo ,some f.L the expressions employed
by Mr. ·St. John in the case of Shipmoney, 3- St. Tr. 826; ~6, et seq, and see the extracts in Clede, Military forces of the Crown, I, 3, 4•
.. If the prerogative exists as part of the "Crown and kingly dignity" while it
exists by the common law it could be at least nominally differentiated from the common
law right of the subject. Perhaps the most persuasive arguments for the differentiation
of the prerogative right are the clau,ses of various Acts of Parliament expressly authorizing the exercise of martial law ~n Ireland, which have declared that such legislation shall not affect the rignt of the Crown to exercise martial law. Thus in 39 Geo.
III, u (Irish) it is provided that "nothing in this act contained shall be construed
to take away, abridge or diminish, the acknowledged prerogative of His·Majesty, for the
·public safety, to resort to the exercise of martial law against open enemies or traitors."
See also 43 Geo. III, c. n7; 3 & 4 Wm, IV, c. 4. § 40. But the argument from these
statntes while it has persuaded at least one prominent authority on the subject, Mr.
Hargrave (see .Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on Con. Law, 190) bas had little weight
in the courts. The statutes are explained away in R. v. Nelson & Brand (1867), Cockbum'.s Report, 70-74; see also R. v. Eyre (1868), Finlason's Report, 73, 74; Grant
v. Gould (179:>), " H. Bl. 6g, ·!)3. Iu the Petition of Right case of [1915], 3 K. B.
649, there is no reference to any of these statutes. Stephen speaks of "the common
law right of the Crown and its representatives to repel force by force; in the cas~ pf· in·
vasion or insurrection, and to act against rebels as it might_ against invaders." And
speaking of 39 Geo. III, c. IJ:, and ;i.· & 4 Wm. IV, c. 4. be says: "It is impossible
to suppose that such declarations as these should operate as a repeal oi the Petition of
Right as regarded Ireland.'' Hist. of Criminal Law I, 208, 2n. See also W. S. Holdsworth in Law Quart. Rev. XVIII, 126-128.
"°See Ency, of the Laws of Eng. VI, 403, note g. •
11 For a statement of this theory see H. Earle Richards, Martial Law, Law Quart.
Rev. XVIII, l3J, 139, 140. For a critic;ism see Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 7th
Ed., 550.
m It will be found difficult always to distinguish thc;>se who incline toward the stricter
from those who are satisfied with the less exacting view. Nor is this for the present
purpose particularly important.
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to be politically expedient in the circumstances of a threatening situation, also has had more than one able champion. Sir Frederick
Pou.ocK has taken it in an interesting paper.58
The rule given in the latest authoritative utterance, the decision
above considered, can not be described as the rule of immediate or
strict necessity, and should not be described as a rule of political
expediency. It is the rule of reasonable necessity. ~~ZENS-HAlIDY
announces the rule of reasonable· necessity in so many words. &a•
And WARRINGTON says: "The only condition which it would appear
·must be fulfilled is that the act in question, having regard to existing
·· cirC'1111stances, must be· necessary for t~e ·public safety and defence
of the realm, and on ·this matter the opinion .of the competent authorities. who alone have sufficient knowledge of the facts, provided
they act. reasonably and in good faith, should be accepted as conclusive."H
·
A rule of reasonable necessity is a flexible one, in any branch
of the law. It has the disadvantage of some uncertainty, but it has
. the perhaps more than compensating advantage of equitable adaptation to actual conditions. To be understood it must be examined
against its own proper background, though it will become a finely
adjusted instrument of judicial measurement only ·after it has been
repeate~y applied. Such a rule, when accepted as a measure of the
official or individual power in time of public emergency to invade
11 Law Qua{t. Rev. XVIII, 15:z. Sec also Finch, C. J., in the case of Shipmoney, 3
St. Tr., at p. IZ34- "Consider the application of the principles to modern conditions," says
Sir· Frederick Pollock, "An enemy's army has landed in force in the north and is
marching on York. The peace is kept in London and Bristol, and the courts 'arc not
closed. It is known that evil-disposed persons have agreed to land at several ports
for the purpose of joining the enemy and giving them aid and information. Bristol is
one of the suspected ports.. What shall the Lord Mayor of Bristol do? I submit that
it is his plain moral duty [which
later declaiCll to be a legal bbligation] • • • to
assume control of the railway traffic and forbid undesirable passengers to proceed north·
ward, and to exercise a strict censorship and inquisitorial power over letters and tele·
grams." Law Quart. Rev. XVIII, 162. Critics of this position will ask whether any
of the Mayors of England have felt themselves endowed with such authority on merely
suspected or apprehended danger in the present war. Mr. Dicey remarks that one
of the circumstances which give ·"an appaient but merely apparent impressiveness to
the doctrine of political expediency, is the current idea that, at a great crisis, you
cannot have too much energy. But this notion is a popular delusion. The fussy
activity of a hundred mayors playing the part of public spirited despots would increase
tenfold the miseries and the dangers imposed upon the country by an invasion." Dicey,
Law of the Const., 7th Ed., 554113• See the use of the term by Stephen, History of the Criminal Law, I, .204, .205.
"This would seem to reserve to the court a power to determine whether tlie "com·
petent authorities" that are amenable to the courts have acted reasonably and in good
faith. Notwithstanding the contentions of some recent writers, for. example, H. Erle
ltichards in Law Quart. Rev. XVIII, 140, probably the idea that the power of
judicial review of such acts has been denied either by this case or the Marais case [1902]
A. C. 109, would be strongly resisted.
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or curtail private rights, is held within bounds in various ways by
history and precedent.
The court said that the Crown might take private land without
compensation for the defence of the realm before there was actual
invasion by troops, if that was reasonably necessary.55 But this is
far from approving the principle-enunciated by a majority of the
judges in the Shipmoney case but discredited by the Petition of
Right-that mere "expectancy of danger" would warrant the exercise of the prerogative.56 It was the decision of CROKE, and the
argument of HoLBORNE, one of liAMPDEN's cou17sel in that case,
that the Petition of Right confirmed.57 HoLBORNE declared that
mere expectancy of danger did not enlarge the powers of the Crown
one whit, that only the actual presence of pressing danger did "this.
Ruler and subject alike might do what was ·necessary to ward off such
danger. "Put the case," he said, "an enemy was landed, to show
what the powers are by our laws in that case for defence; when
there is a particular appearance of instant and apparent danger, in
that case particular property must yield much to necessity. These
cases our books warrant, as building of bulwarks on another man's
ground, and burning corn. In I 588 there was an actual danger
and then it was just to take com or grass or anything ~o raise supplies.
But where do any of our books say that upon fear qf danger, though
in the King's case, a man· can without leave make a bulwark in
another man's land, I do not read. * * * Levis timor will not serve.
* * :le but such a fear as ariseth from an actual and apparent danger."58 HoLBORNE's reference to 1588, an illustration not of actual
but of threatened invasion, by the Great Armada, shows that his view
was not a narrow one. 59 It might have been cited by the Court of
Appeal and Court of King's Bench in 1915 to support their vJew.
11 In this view of the common law it might seem that 43 Geo. III, c. 55, s. Io,
enacted when an invasion by Napoleon was feared, in so far as it provided that no
private land should be taken without the consent of the owner unless "the enemy shall
have actually invaded the United Kingdom at the time," actually limited the prerogative.
The act has since been repealed.
""See 3 St. Tr. at p. i234. Perhaps it is not without some significance that while
Avory, J., cited the Shipmoney case in support of his decision, the judges of the Court
of Appeal eschewed all reference to it. · Those who held that the prerogative as well
as the Defence of the Realm Act warranted the taking of land without compensationone judge, Pickford, expressed no opinion as to the prerogative--based their decision,
so far as judicial precedent was concerned, almost wholly on the case of The King's
Prerogative in Saltpetre, 12 Co. 12.
11 See Law Quart. Rev.· XVIII., 125.
"'3 St. Tr., at 975.
'"The same illustration was given by Finch, C. J., to support his contention that
mere expectancy of danger warrants the exercise of the prerogative. 3 St. Tr., at I.234Hue is a common meeting ground, the basis for what is perhaps the true test. It is
the reality of the danger as against (1) mere expectancy of danger, or (.2) on the purely
physical test of actual invasion or similar overt manifestation.

MARTIAL LAW IN EN_GLAND

III

And if the rule of reasonable necessity does not justify martial
law on a mere expectancy of danger neither would it make political
expediency a sanction for martial law. "Reasonable necessity" and
"expediency" are not equivalent.terms. It will reqt\ire no argument
to demonstrate this
anyone who i!? at all familiar with judicial
wrestling over the concepts "reasonable" and "reasonably necessary,"
in any one of several branches of the law.110 • By the overwhelming·
weight 0£ authority the conditio~ that will justify martial law
must be such as seemingly to compel, not merely to counsel, emergency measures. Such measures ~ust be necessary, whether strictly
or reasonably necessary; they may not be simply expedient. To ·the

fo

words of the Court

of

Appeal and the words of HoLBORNE in the

Hampden case might be added many
silence of a few.

others, and the no less eloquent

Without here going into shades of difference or

peculiarities of treatment it will suffice to note thaf neither HALE,60
nor CoKE,61 NoY,62 Rou.E,68 BLACKSTONE, 6 ' Lord LouGHBOROUGH, 611
Lord BRoUGHAM,66 Sir George CROK£,67 STEPHEN,68 Judge-Advocate.
.. For example, in the application of. the rule that an easement can be created by
implied grant only where it is reasonably. necessary to the enjoyment of the property
by the grantee, or in the application of the rule-in quite another branch of the lawthat contracts in reasonable restraint of trade are not illegal.
'°When earlier writers such as Hale, Coke and Blackstone use the term martial
Jaw they are speaking of the law applicable to the soldier. See R. v. Nelson & :Brand,
99, loo, 104- And see the animadversion on Lord liale by Attorney General Cushing
in 8 Atty. General's Opinions, 365. :But they make clear that even in emergent cases
expediency is not a justification for denial of those conuhon iaw remedies in which the
liberty of the Englishman consists. See Hale, History of the Common Law, 35, and
see comment in R. v. Nelson & Brand, 57n, et seq.
11 3 Coke 52; Rushworth's Hist. Collections III, App. 81.
See the comment of
Hargrave on these opinions of Colee, Noy, Rolle and :Banks declared· to a comu'.iittee
of the House of Commons sitting on martial law. Hargrave, Jurisconsult Exercitations
I, 399, in R. v. Nelson & Brand, Cockburn's Report, 63.
82 Rttshworth's Hist. Collections III., App. So. ·
a "The question is now when this 'Martial Law is to be used, and upon whom the
Common Law is the highest for the Subject * * * every Liege man inherits the Law,
it is the inheritance of the King, this great inheritance is not to be taken from him,
and Martial Law is merely for necessity, when the Common Law cannot take place;
now for the time when that necessity falls out, in times of Peace it cannot, for now
we must consider what is time of Peace and War." Rushworth, Hist. Collections III,
App. 7!>- .
"Comm: I, 413.
•Grand v. Gould, 2 H. :Bl. 69, 98. Here, as late as 1792, we find an :English judge
using martial law "in the same or much the same sense as Hale and Coke used it."
See Cushing's comment in 8 Opinions of Atty's. Gen., 365, 366.
eo Created by necessity, necessity must limit its continuance. It would be the worst
of all conceivable grievances-it would be a calamity unspeakable-if the whole law
aud constitution of England were suspended one hour longer than the most imperious
necessity demanded." n Hansard's Debates (2), 968; Clode, Military Forces of the
Crown, 484.
·
01 Case of Shipmoney, 3 St. Tr. 826, n62.
•Hist. of the Criminal Law, I, 215, 216.
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General Sir David DuNDAS,69 Justice. BLACKBURN70 and Chief
Justice CocKBURN71 in the famous Jamaica cases of I867-I86S, nor
any of the leading cases bearing on this question-such as the case
of Saltpetre,12 Wolf Tone's case,73 Elphin$/one v. Bedreecliund,n
the Marais case,75 (in short hardly any of the leading English authorities) can be cited to tlie proposition that expediency or anything less.
than a real necessity will justify executive authority in resorting to
the emergency measures of martial law. Nor need the statement
take a negative form; many of these authorities and others besides,76
notably distinguished law officers of the Crown,77 American judges,78
and constitutional writers such as KENT79 and Attorney General
CusHING80 ·have taken a most positive stand.
The present aspect of our question then comes down to this:
Would the Crown acting through its ministers have had the prerogative right in the emergency of I9I4 and following to make the rules
and bring about the judicial, administrative and military situation
among' civilians brought about by the Defence of the Realm Ac~
•See the extracts from his answers to Sir Robert_ Peel, Mr. Gladstone and others

in 1849, in Stephen, Hist. of the Criminal !,aw, I, :n3, :m1;
to R. v. Eyre, Fintason's Report, 74u R. v. Nelson & Brand, Cockburn's Report, 69.
,. 12 Co. Rep. 12, 13.
"27 St. Tr. 616.
n 2 St. Tr. N. S. 379. See I,ord 'J,'enterden's opinion at 449- Arbitrary imprison·
ment was justified in this case because it was made "if not fiagrante yet nondum cessante
hello.'' Holdsworth identifies this decision wiih the Marias case, but Sir Frederick
Pollock thinks it not an unessential distinction that in Elphinstone v. Bedreechund there
had never been any regular. jurisdiction in the territory in question. 18 !,aw Quart.
Rev. 129, 130n.
n "It may often be a question whether a mere riot, or disturbance neither so serious
nor so extensive as really to amount to a war at all, has not been treated with an exces,
sive severity, and whether the intervention of the military force was necessary.'' [1902]
A. c. 109, us.
t• In a letter dated July 13, 16.¥>, I,ord Conway wrote: '.'The lawyers and judges
are all of opinion that Martial !,aw cannot be executed here in England but when
an enemy is really near to an army of the King's.'' See Clode, Military Forces of the
Crown, I, 23, 441.
n Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on Cons. !,aw, 198, 201, 2I4- In the joint opinion
of Mr. Edward James and Mr. Fitzjames Stephen on Martial !,aw, with reference
to the Jamaica Insurrection of 1866, they said: "As to the legal power of the officers
sitting as a court-martial at Morant Bay, we are of opinion that they had no powers
as a court-martial, and that they could justify the execution of Mr. Gordon only if, and
in ao far as they could show that, the step was immediately and unavoidably necessary
for the preservation of .peace and the restoration of order.'' ·Forsyth, op. cit. 562. See
the generalization to like effect in Edinburgh Review, Jan., 1902, 101.
n See Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wa!L 121, 127.
n Comm. II, 341n.
eo 8 Opinions of Attorneys General 365. Cushing's opinion finds a prominent place in
English citations. This is the more interesting because of his rasping comment on
Hale's and I,ord Loughborough's view of martial law. See Forsyth, Cases and
Opinions on Cons. !,aw, 209; Ency. of the I,aws of England VI, 403n; W. S. Holdsworth
in !,aw Quart. Rev. XVIII, 129.
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and Regulations? And if the Executive had of its own initiative
entered upon such a titanic programme would it have escaped unscathed? Would its acts have been regarded as reasonably necessary? If an act of Parliament seems expedient does it follow that the
same act by the Executive must be "reasonably necessary"?
It is probable that almost every recognized authority upon constitutional law, and as well the political instinct of the government
itself, woul4 answer·these.questions with an emphatic "No." 'Not
even the most convinced advocate of the doctrine that political necessity ·or expediency is a s.ufficient defence for the establishment of
martial law has been heard to say that the Executive in circumstances
like th~e could legally accomplish what Parliament has accomplished. And it should ·be remembered that only a part of what
Parliament has done has been recorded here.
It would be admitted by some if not all that the Executive could
within botmds, in places and on occasions where the need was urgent,
make arbitrary arrests, suppress the press, appropriate or destroy
private property, perhaps establish government by military tribunal,
the highest badge of martial la;w,81 in short do whatever upon the
theatre of the emergency8 ~ necessity might dictate. But to say
~t in such circumstances as existed the Executive could have done
11 But some would energetically deny this, and would be able to give a considerable
atray of authority to the effect that martial law in this sense is unlcno'wn to E:11glish
law, and is to be sharply distinguisbed from the admitted common law right to repel
force with force. Chief Justice Cockburn, Lord Loughborough, Hale, Blackstone, Coke,
Dicey and others would be cited to this effect. See Edinburgh Review, Jan., 1902, 8s,
90, 105 0 which says that "upon the whole though the subject is somewhat barren of
judicial authority, the better opinion would seem to be that martial la.w in its proper
1ense, is unknown to the law of E;ngland." In the article on martial law in the E;ney•
clopa.edia. Britannica, by Sir John Scott, Deputy Judge Advocate General to the Forces,
it is admitted that martial law in the above sense is unknown to the law of E;ngland.
But this writer like others observes that this state of opinion may be explained ~
the fact that in England there had nev.er been a state similar for example to that pre·
Yailing in Cape Colony in 1900-1902, when martial la.w was declared. "It may perhaps
be questioned," he says, "whether the statement would have been made with such
certainty if similar events had been present to the writers' minds." ' And compare
the rather broad if somewhat indefinite statements by .Warrington and Cozens-Hardy
in [1915] 3 K. B. 649.
a And this would not need to be narrowly construed. One part of the country
might be in a state of invasion or rebellion, other parts apparently unaffected, and
yet the general safety make arbitrary arrest, let us say, of imperious necessity. This
seems to be cl>nceded even by so firm an advocate of the principles that strict necessity ·only excuses martial law as Mr. Dicey. See his Law of the Constitution, 7th
Ed., 542. "In inany places there may outwardly be peace, and yet modem means
of communication may admit of important aid being conveyed to the enemy in the
shape of information, supplies and personal adherents. In this manner the effective
radius of a war .has been multiplied tenfold or more.'' Sir F.rederick Pollock, Law
Quart. Rev. XVIII, 156. But on the other hand the mere fact that the nation is
engaged' in foreign war does not of itself make an uninvaded country the theatre of
war or change the legal "time of peace" to legal "time of war,". whic:h alone would
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what Parliament has done would be to say that although the general
security of the inhabitants of. the British Isles did not appear to be
seriously threatened, it could make rules intended to operate generally
and for the period of the war, drastically curtailing or totally extinguishing the ordinary rights of all the people, and that it could
throughout the realm enforce these rules by a system of tribunals
whose operation imports the abrogation of other equally fundamental
rights.
For their better definition and security these rights have been set
down princip.ally in the four great charters or statutes of Magna
Charta,83 the Petition of Right, 84 the Bill of Rights, 85 the Act of
Settlement, 86 and in the Habeas Corpus Acts. 87 They secure to the
individual the peaceful enjoyment of his rights of property, and protect him in his person from illegal detentions or punishments, He
may not be taken on arrest, be imprisoned, be deprived of his liberties or "othenvise molested" except in accordance with the law
of the land and under all the protections which it throws around him.
He may not be judged or condemned "except by the lawful judgment of his peers," and justice or right may not be "sold or denied
or deferred" to him. 88 The right to act as he desires, provided he
heeds the law, his immunity from wrongful detention and imprison.
ment are reinforced and ensured by the Habeas Corpus Acts,sD and
though the Crown be "the ·source and fountain of justice," it may
issue only such commissions to administer the law as are warranted
justify martial law. .The distinction is technical but it is of great importance to a
correct understanding of this subject.' Referring to the famous debate by Coke, Noy,
Banks and Rolle as to martial law in III Rushworth's Historical Collections, App. Soso frequently· cited to the rule that when the •courts are open it is time of peaceMr. H. Erle Richards, after pointing out that the real test must be the necessity of the
occasion, goes on to say: "But what were the circumstances there. This country was
at war with France, but there had been no invasion of England and no state of
war existed there. The speakers appealed to the fact that the ordinary business of
the courts was continuing as evidence that there was no necessity for superseding the
ordinary law in the one function of martial law to which the Petition of Right referred, viz., the trial of offenders by military courts. There was no reason in the
circumstances why offenders should not be dealt with by the ordinary process, for
in fact there was no war. Even if opinions expressed in debate in the Commons in
those contentious times could be safely accepted as the sober judgment of the
speakers, it seems certain that they had" in their minds only the particular facts before
them and did not intend to enumerate any principle of universal application.'' Law
Quart. Rev. XVIII, 142•
.. 12IS, see Adams & Stevens, Select Documents, 42.
"1627, 3 Car. I, c. l .
85 1688, l 'Viii. & Mary, sec. 2, c.
.. 1701, 12 & 13 Will. III, c. 2.
81
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For a clear and instructive statement of the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus
and the reason for legislative protection of it see Goodnow: Principles of Constitutional
Government, 252.
18 Magna Charta, sec. 40.
80 See 31 Car. II, c. 2.
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by the common or statute law.00 The very prerogative of the Crown,
the Executive, is both controlled and limited ·by the common law.01
In consequence the sovereign can claim no prerogative which the law
does not allow.0 2 His prerogat_ives are not only subordinate to and
limited by the great charters of English liberty, but as well by any
other· statute.03 They may not trespass upon the "acknowledged_
rights" of. the subj.ect.9 ' It is a fundamental general rule that.the King
cannot sanction any act forbidden by law; it is in that point of view
. that he is under, and not above, the laws ; that he is bound by them
· equally with his subjects.9 ~ T~erefore ·the courts have full juris-· diction and authority to enquire into the existence and extent of any
alleged prerogative, a-power whic;h they have exercised in numerous
instances.93 a In a word, as was declared in the Act of Settlement,
'.'the laws of England are the birthright of the people thereof, and
all the kings and queens who shall ascend the throne * * * ought
to administer the government of the same according to the said
lap;s, and all their officers and ministers ought to serve them res~ectively accordmg·to the same.~' 98
to Com. Dig: Prerog. D. 29; '.BL Co?UII. I, 233.
"All comnuss1011s of new in·
vention are against law unti1 they have allowance by act of Parliament." 4 Co. Inst. 163.
"The commission for creating the late court of commissioners for ecclesiastical causes
and ,all other conunissions' and courts of like nature are illegal and pernicious." '.Bill
or'Rights, r Will. & Mary, sec. 2,
11 Bl. Conun. I, 233.
" "For the king has not any prerogative, but such as the law allows." Com. Dig.
tit. Prerog. A.
.~"And by the St. of Marlb. • • • no prerogative of the king can be claimed con·
trary to Magna Charta." Com. Dig. tit. Prerog. A.; 2 Co. Inst. 36, 54""Though I am desirous of ·maintaining the prerogative of the Crown in its
just and proper limits, yet at the same time I must have a care of making a· precedent on the records ·of the court, of extending the authority of the Crown, so as to
restrain the h'berty of the subject • • • further than the law will allow." Lord
'Chancellor Hardwicke in ex parte Bamesly (1744), 3 Atk. 167, 171.
·
• Chitty, Prerogative of the Crown, 5.
•a In the case' of Monopolies, I I Co. 84b, alleged prerogatives of the Crown "in
matters of recreation and pleasure" and the creation of monopolies therein were search·
ingly examin~d, and denied. On. the prerogative of dispensations it was said in
:f;dward v. Sorrel, Vaughan 330, 332, 334, "I observed not that any steady Rule
hath been drawn from the Cases cited to guide a man's Judgment, where the King
may or may not dispense imperial Laws, excepting that old Rule taken from the Case
of I I H. 7. That with Malum prohibitum by Stat. the King may dispense, but not
with Malum per se. • • • But I deny that the king can' dispense with every Malum
prohibitum by Statute, though prohibited by statute only. • • • Where the suit is
only the King's for breach of a Law, which is not to the particular damage of any
third person the King may dispense; but where the suit is only the King's, but for
the benefit and safety of a third person, and the King is entitled to the Suit by the
prosecution and release of such third person; the King cannot release, disc;harge or
dispense with the Suit, but by the consent and agreement of the party concern'd."
And see the East India Company v. Sandeys, IO St. Tr. 371, 454, 516, SI?l trial of
Sir Edward Hales, I I St. Tr. u66•
• I2 & I3 Will. III, c. 2.

II6

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

IV.
PARI,IAMENT'S BREAK WITH PARUAMENTARY TRADI'l'IONS.-THE
CONSTITUTION A'ME;NDF;D.
. Parliament is not, like the Congress of the United States, a legislativ,e body of delegated powers. Its authority is supreme, the scope
.of its legislative activity unlimited. It is both the law-making power~
in the ordinary sense of that term, and the organ which has the power
to amend the constitution. No limits restrain it in the exercise of
either of these functions ; no limits, that is, except such as must
necessarily exist in any organization of the sovereign power. There
are, as Professor DICEY has pointed out, external and internal limits
to any such authority. The external limit to legislation that is contrary to the settled desires of the people is the possibility or the
certainty that the people or a large number of them, will resist or
disobey. Even a despot's power is so limited. "This is shown by
the most notorious facts of history. Non~ of the early Caesars could
at tlieir pleasure have subverted the worship or fundamental institutions of the Roman world. * * * Louis the Fourteenth at the height
of his power could revoke the Edict of Nantes, but he would have
found it impossible to establish the supremacy of Protestantism, _and
for the same reason which prevented James the Second from establishing the supremacy of Roman Catholicism. * * * Parliament
might legally establish an Episcopal Church in Scotland; Parliament
might legally tax the colonies ; Parliament might without" any breach
of law change the succession to the throne or abolish the monarchy;
but everyone knows that in the present state of -the world the British
Parliament will do none of these things. In each case widespread
resistance would result from legislation, which though legally valid,
is in fact beyond the stretch of Parliament<t.ry power."97 The other,
the internal limit, is found in the nature of the sovereign power
itself. The power of Parliament is limited by what Parliament is.
Or as Leslie STEPHEN puts' it, ."the legislature is the product of a
certain social condition, and determined by whatever determines the
society."98
There can be no guestion then that the system brought about by
the Defence of the Realm Acts and Regulations is legal. All this is
within the capacity of Parliament.99 And in the light of its loyal
OT Dicey, I.aw of the Const. (7th Ed.),· 75·77·
•Quoted in Dicey, op. cit. 78.
t:O "Now, nobody ,can deny for a moment the power of Parliament to enact that
martial law shall be put in force; and in case of need, a wise government would probably, if it had the opportunity, have recourse to Parliamentary authority for the purpose."
Chief Justice Cockburn in R. v. Nelson and Brand, Cockburn's Report, 53.
•
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acceptance by the people it would. seem that no question can be made
as to· whether Parliament has kept within its natural limits. It ·is
supported hy public opinion. But this is not to say that Parliament
has not changed the constitution. That question is already partly
answered. We have considered the limitations upott the Executive
acting alone. We may ~ow tum to see what precedent, if any, there
is for such executive action under a direct Parliamentary grant
of power.
Until August, I9I4, Parliament had never conferred upon executive or military authorities of England such power over the rights
of the people as it did at that time. On}y once, and then when the
great Civil War was at its height and for a period of four months
only, 10~ had it ever conferred .upon courts-martial the power to try
civilians in England.10 ~ The measure ~as· distinctly a war measure
given in time of war, to b:e exercised plainly enough, upon the theatre
of war, which England then was.102
Parliament had constantly stopd guard against the encroachment
of the Executive, very jealous of its aggrandizement where the rights
of the people might suffer. And when there was riot or rebellion,
m~ing it necessary for the Executive to use force, Parliament had
plp.yed its part after and not ·before the event. It had indemnified
the officers and civilians for what they had done,1° 8 it had in some
eases congratulated them; e% post facto it had rendered legal illegality.10' But it had not in anticipation of an emergency said to the.
"" "T'ne tern'ble certainty of conviction by courts·martial summoned under military
authority, made Parliament hesitate long, even in time of great social disorder, before
it gave any sanction (arid for four months only), to such tn'bunals acting under martial
law." Clode, MiJitary> Forces ot the Crown, II., i58.
·
101 Ordinance of August i6, i644, with additional article September i6, i644, 5 Rush·
worth's Hist. Collections, part III., 717, ns.
'°"The almost total absence of comment upon this ordinance (it is not mentioned
even by. Chief Justice Cockburn in his elaborate review of instances of martial law iri
the charge in R. v. Nelson and Brand), indicates its character perhaps better than any·
thing. And see the above case. Cockburn's Report, 53.
111 S'ec the interesting statutory pardon of s. Richard II., c. 6. Acts such as 39
Geo. III., c.n, are more to the point however. For a review of the more noteworthy
acts see R. v. Nelson and Brand, Cockburn's Report, 49-57.
'°' Much has been made of these acts of indemnity. Those who maintain that
martial law must be distinguished in England from the right to repel force with force,
and in such sense is illegal, cite the custom of passing these acts as manifest proof of
the illegality of martial law. See R. v. Nelson and Brand, Cockburn's Report, 74- "The
view that the Crown is not legally competent to declare martial Jaw either in the United
Kingdom or in the .colonies, even in time of war or· rebellion, would seem to derive
considerable confirmation from tbe fact that after every proclamation of martial Jaw
there has followed an act of indemnity; and it does not appear to us that this argu·
ment could be disposed of by the suggestion that they are only measures of precaution."
Edinburgh Review, Jan., 1902, 90. · On the nature and effect of an act of indemnity
see Dicey, Law of the Cons. (7th Ed.), 47, 228, 231, 547-549. In sharp contrast with
his view that ~e purpose of an. act of indemnlty is to legalize illegality Sir Frederick
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Executive that it might do what it found expedient, and that it
should not suffer for it.
The Petition of Right which so strikingly exemplifies the P.arliamentary role, was not a charter of new liberties, but a confirmation of ancient liberties, a -check to royal pretensions which had often
stifled these liberties. For one thing, Tudor and Stuart kings,105
contrary to the Great Charter, had in time of peace, or in time of
merely apprehended danger, issued commissions ·by which, in the
words of the Petition of Right, "certain persons" had been "assigned
and appointed Commissioners, with power and authority to proceed,
within the land, according to the justice of Martial Law, against
such soldiers and marines, or other dissolute persons joining with
them as should commit any * * * felony, mutiny, or other outrage
or misdemeanor whatsoever; and by such summary course and order
as is agreeable to Martial Law, and is used in armies in time of war,
to proceed to the trial and condemnation of such offenders, and them
to cause to be executed and put to death according to the Law
Martial."106 . Parliament declared that this was illegal, and the king
Pollock has maintained that while such acts are not superfluous their office is not to
justify unlawful acts ex post facto but "to quiet doubts." "An act of indemnity," he
says, "is a measure of prudence and grace.'' Law Quart. Rev. XVIII, 157, and see the
criticism in Dicey, op cit. 553. Acts of indemnity are alt a rule so framed as to protect
such acts as have been bona fide and necessary. They do not protect one who has been
guilty of wanton wrong doing. May it not be said that acfs of indemnity, while in
some cases they have merely served to quiet doubts, have in others established a diS·
pensation of leniency rendering legal morally defensible, because not flagrant, acts of
power for which in the absence of such legislation there would have been no legal defense?
See remiµ-ks by Lord Chan~ellor Thurlow in 21 Cobbett's- ParL Hist. 736. In the case of
Wright v. Fitzgerald, 27 St. Tr. 759, at 765, although it is said that one "may not
exceed the necessity which gave him the power," it seems to be held that if the act
is not wanton it is indemnified. In this case a sheriff who had flogged a man without
any pretense that he was implicated in the Irish rebellion, was held liable in damages.
See also Forsyth, Cases and Opinions in Cons. Law., :n3, 21+ Acts of indemnity have
not been unknown in the United States. See Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents,
(2nd Ed.), 1295 and citations.
.
105 17 Rymer's Foedera, 43, .246, 647.
Chief Justice Cockburn in R. v. Nelson and
Brand, Cockburn's Report, 25 et seq., enters into a detailed historical r-:view of the
origin and exercise of martial law in its application to civilians. Rejecting the trial of
the Earl of Lancaster in the reign of Edward II., as probably not a case of martial law,
he finds that the first instance occurred .in the Wat Tyler insurrection of Richard II.'s
reign. See aspecially pp. 35, 39, 40, 43, for the more noteworthy cases; also Hallam,
Cons. Hist. of England, I., 237, 240-243; R. v. Eyre, Finlason's Report, 70-74.
105 (1) "In very early times various systems of law co-existed in this country-as the
common law, the ecclesiastical law, the law of the Court of Admiralty, etc. One of
these was the law martial, exercised by the constable and marshal over troops in actual
service, and especially on foreign service. (:z.) The existence of this system in cases
of foreign service or actual warfare appears to have led to attempts on the part of
various sovereigns to introduce the same system in time of peace on emergencies, and
especially for the punishment of breaches of the peace. This was declared to be illegal
by the Petition of Right. * * * Although martial law in sense (1) is obsolete, and in
sense (2) is declared by the Petition of Right to be illegal, the expression has survived,
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was forced to subscribe to the instrument which so solemnly confirmed its illegality.107 Still later in the Bill of Rights, in the Habeas
Corpus Acts, and in the Act or Settlement, Parliament was moving
mightily to the same end; carving deeper the assurances of civil
liberty.
From the time of the Revolution dOWJ1. to the War of 1914
England had had little experience of the exercise of emergency
powers by the Executive,1° 8 and in none of these cases did Parliament enact anticipatory laws authorizing officials to exceed their
customary authqrity or, after the Executive had acted, indulge
.. any presumption as to the legality of such questionable acts.
In three instances,. in I7I5, I745, and I78o, the authority of the
civil government was in part overcome. In I7I5 invasion was
threatened, the Pretender landei;l in Scptland, and there was rebellion. The govemmenf issued a proclamation on July 25th109 authorizing all officers whether civil or military, to suppress the rebellion, by force of arms if necessary. Parliament had not acted,
and not 1:1ntil six months later-when it opened-did it act. The
and has been applied to a very different thing; napiely, to the common law right of the
Crown and. its representatives to repel force b_y force in the case of invasion or insnr·
rection, and to ·act against rebels as it might against invaders." Stephen, History of
the Criminal Law, I, 207, reproducing with some slight changes the opinion, drawn
by himself, and signed by Mr. Edward James and himself in reference to the Jamaica
insurrection. The opinion is in Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on Cons. Law, 551.
In the opinion it is said that the term martial law in the last sense above is used, "we
think, inaccurately and improperly." These words are not reproduced in the history•.
And see the definition of martial law at p. 215 of the history, which is identical with
that in the opinion, Forsyth, op. cit. 559.
m Seo Hallam, Cons. Hist. of England I., 38g-39:z. "It must be noticed that these
· commissions were issued and executed in time of peace; the powers conferred ·were
to be used • • • for the more speedy punishment of any crimes that might be com·
mitted by offenders, either in the commission or pay of the Crown, or by civilians associated with them. The argument against the legality of these commissions rested upon
this principle,-tbat in the time of peace the civil magistrate bad cognizance of all'
offenses committed against the public peace, and that the civil population ought notwhatever rule should be applied to soldiers-to be subjected to martial law. The
status of an offender was at that time a doubtful necessity upon which to rest his life
or liberty, and therefore the Petition of Right made no distinction between the Civil
and Military population, but declared these commissions of Martial Law against any
p~son whatsoever to be wholly and directly contrary to the lavts and status of the
realm." Clode, Military Forces of the Crown I., 19, and see 17-19.
108 Chief Justice Cockburn maintains that "the last instance or these attempts to
declare martial law in England * * * occurred in the reign of Charles I.,'' and that
since the Petition of Right "martial law has never been attempted to be exercised in the
realm of England by virtue of the prerogative." R. v. Nelson and Brand, Cockburn's
Report, 43. 45 and see 47, cf. Clode, Military Forces of the Crown II., 168. If some·
thing less than government by military tribunals may constitute martial law Cockburn's
view would not be tenable. "The popular (and sometimes official) notion that martial
law necessarily means trial by court martial has caused much confusion." Sir Frederick
Pollock in Law Quart. Rev. XVIII, 155·
100 Printed in Clode, Military Forces of the Crown II, app. 655.
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speech from the throne of January 9th, I7I6, congratulated the army
as "having disappointed our enemies and contributed so much to
the safety of the nation." Congratulations from both houses,110 and
action sanctioning what had been done were forthcoming.111 Authority to suspend the Ha:beas Corpus Act, to seize the horses of
suspected persons and to try rebels in any county was given.112 Beyond this Parliament was pleased to approve and legalize. The
power to indemnify for an actually or possibly illegal act is not
unlike the power to pardon, and after the Rebellion had been suppressed these special acts of Parliamentary grace went hand in
hand. There was an act to pardon the rebels, and an act to indemnify, to discharge from civil or criminal liability, those who had
suppressed the rebels.113
In the rebellion of I745 which attended the landing and efforts
of Charles Edward, the son of the Pretender, tl}is action of Parliament was practically repeated~ Parliament was in recess at the
outbreak of the rebellion. The King on the advice of the Privy
Council, issued a prodamation114 and charged all civil magistrates
to do their utmost to prevent and suppress riots, and to put in
execution all laws made for preventing the same. This was early
'in September. Parliament reassembled in October and both Houses
voted addresses pledging tliemselves to support the authority of
the Crown.11G Suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus was
authorized,116 an act was passed providing for. the speedy trial of
offenders by the ordinary courts,117 and finally there was an act of indemnity in much the same terms as the act that had followed. the
earlier rebellion.118
t
Speaking of the rebellions of I7I5 and I745 Chief Justice COCKBURN has said: "In neither of these was martial law attempted to
be exercised. It is true that after the battle of Culloden [I746]
horrible barbarities were perpetrated-but not by virtue of martial
law. The wounded who were slaughtered in cold blood on the field,
the day after the battle, or who were dragged from the neighboring
houses where they had taken refuge and executed, or who were
"' Cobbett's Par!. Hist., .225, .244
111 Ibid., .275, .276.
= l Geo. I, .2, c. 3.3. There had been "no attempt to bring persons before courtsmartial who ought to be tried by the Common Law (save in the instance of the halfpay officers at Preston.)" Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, II, 164
:111 C!ode, op. cit., II, l 64.
m Printed in parf-in Clode, op. cit., II, app. 657.
:m 13 Cobbett's Par!. Hist., 1326, 1362.
"' 19 Geo. II. 1 c. l.
111 19 Geo. II., c. 9.
:118 19 Geo. II., c. 20.
Clode, op. cit., II, 165.

MARTIAL LAW IN ENGLAND

I2I

burned in the house in which they lay helpless, were not put to
death under any pretence of martial law. * * * I rejoice to think
that the name of law, even of martial law, was not profaned and
polluted by being associated with such atrocities as these."11"
In the Lord George Gordon riots of 178o the troops were called
out to aid the civil authorities. But, in the words of the Secretary at War, "in one instance the ·civil Magistrate, having called
for the .troops, was not ready to attend them; * * * in another instance, the troops having been called out, were left by the Magis-,.
trates exposed to the fury of the populace; and * * * in two other
· instances ~fter the troops had marched to the places appointed for
them, several of the Magistrates refused to act."120 "Certainly the
civil power,". Lord MANSFIELD says,121 "whether through native
imbecility, through neglect, or the very formidable force they would
have been obliged to contend with, were unequal to the task of
suppressing the riots and putting an end to the insurrection." In
these circumstances a Council was hastily summoned, a proclamation issued and orders given to the military "by the immediate exertion of their utmost force"122 to repress the riots. Thus the civil
·magistracy having failed to exercise its acknowledged power,123 to
the military in this case was confided the authority independently
to restore peace and order. The toll of lives was more than four
hundred, but" all of them· were taken in the actual suppression of
disturbances, none by the judgment of courts-martial. Indeed there
were no trials by court-martial; though "undoubtedly," said Lord
Chancellor THURI.OW, "in opposing, repressing and quelling such
daring outrages as had lately been ~erpetrated, the military as ~ell
as individuals must necessarily have been forced into excesses''
which "would be seen to have been unavoidable, and to be the
proper subject of an act of indemnity.~•m The Act of Indemnity
:m R. v. Nelson and Brand, Cockburn's Report, 47. And see the similar remarks
on the atrocities of the Monmouth rebellion in the reign of James II., at p. 46.
uo Letter of the Secretary at War to the Secretary of State June 6, 1780, in Clode,
op. cit., App. II, 636.
:m 21 Cobbett's Part. Hist., 698.
·
=See the Proclamation of June 7th, in Clode, op cit., App. II., 659.
m The order of June 5th issued by 'the Secretary at War to the guards to assist the
civil powers read in part: "I do hereby signify to you His Majesty's pleasure that you
hold yourself and the troops under your command in readiness to assist the Civil Magistrate in case lie shall require it, and that upon his requisition, and under his authority,
you do order, from time to time,. such of the said troops as Shall be thought necessary
for the purpose before mentioned, to march to the place or places which the Civil
Magistrate shall point out." Printed in Clode, op cit., II., 635. See the remarks of
Lord Mansfield on the powers and duties of Civil Magistrates in case of riot, Cobbett's
Part. Hist., :21, 695.
"' Cobbett's Part. Hist., 739. Lord Mansfield said that it "had been taken for
granted • • * that His .Majesty, in the orders he gave respecting the riots, acted
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which was passed extended its protection to "magistrates and other
persons" concerned in repressing the riots, thus making no special
mention of the military.125
The above instances, though in two of them there was what
might be called technically invasion, partook of the nature of civil
strife. They afford the principal modern instances in England of
anything approaching martial law. Foreign war in and of itself
had not moved Parliamerit to suspend the civil liberties of the subject. The duel with France from I756 to I763 saw no such legislation as that which the present war evoked. It is true, that war did
not menace the integrity of Britain itself; it was a struggle for
colonial expansion. England was not on the defensive. Led by
Pitt, she was seeking a position where she need fear no rival. But
even the Napoleonic wars, in which until the battle of Trafalgar
there was real dread of invasion,126 passed without the establishment
of martial law or sweeping parliamentary grants of power to the
Executive. Now and again laws were enacted repressing or suspending civil rights. The agitations and demonstrations in England
between I79I and I799-in part a reflection of the French Revolution-resulted in a series of acts127 which almost suspended the popular constitution of England. Another, and even more signal illustration of the use of such ·Parliamentary authority to overcome a
merely upon his prerogative, as being entrusted with the protection and preservation
of the state, in cases arising from necessity, and not provided for in. the ordinary con· .
temptation and execution of law. * * * I take the case to be exactly the reverse, and
that His. Majesty, with the advice of his ministers, acted perfectly and strictly agreeable
to law, and the principles of the constitution." And see the elaborate argument following. 21 Cobbett's Parl Hist., 694-698. It is .interesting to observe in this connection
that while Chief Justice Cockburn in R. v. Nelson and Brand, considers the rebellions
of 1715 and 1745 he entirely passes over the riots of 178o. It would seem to follow
that he would fully agree with Lord Mansfield.
..,. 20 Geo. III., c. 63.
us See the preamble to 55 G~. III., c. 55 (June, 18o3). In the House of Commo~
on June 20, 1803,_the Secretary at War said, "he made little doubt but the army which
would attempt to invade us would be sent to the bottom of the sea, or be dashed to
pieces by the cannons of. those who would be opposed to them. When he looked
to the promises made to the first consul by the different provinces of France, and by
his military ·coadjutors, * * * he made .little doubt, from Bonaparte's character, that
the attempt would be made." 3.6 Cobbett's Parl Hist., 16o3- And see the earlier speech
of Pitt. Ibid, at pp. 1396, 1397·
121 In 1794 the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended.
By the Treasonable Practice
Act of 1795 the law of treason was modified by dispensing with the necessity for the
proof of an overt act in order to secure conviction. The Seditious Meetings Act, also
of 1795, made all meetings of over fifty persons, and all political debates and lectures
subject to the premier's consent and active supervision of magistrates. As a result of
the latter act various political societies and clubs whose activities had been open became
secret organizations, a French invasion was plotted and sedition fomented. Following
the injuries attendant on the Irish rebellion of 1798 the Corresponding Societies Act
(1799) was passed, which completed this series of repressive measures.

'MARTIAL LAW JN. ENGLAND

1~3

dangerous domestic situation is afforded by the laws enacted during
the second decade of the nineteenth century,128 when the Industrial
Revolution sowed the seeds of those great reform measures for
which that century is notable. But these measures were not due :to
foreign war2 and, sinister though they appeared to many people, they
were not martial law.
·
Nor when we turn to· the legislation affecting Ireland or the
4
'settled cQlonies,''1211 do we find any analogy "to. the Defence of the
Realm legislation of I9I4-I9IS•.There were important and highly
significant illustrations of the establishment of martial law by legis·· lati'{e authority180 but the laws thus ena~ed were intended for a "time
-of war" within t4e region affected, whereas it has not yet been
established or perhaps seriously maintained, that Great Britain itself is, or has been S'ince the outbreak of the war, internally in ·other
than a time or state o'f peace, though her technical condition in this
respect-in view of modem military developments-may seem to
be somewhat anomalous.181 It does not appear, at any rate, that
she ~ been in a condition in which necessity has commanded the
trial of civilians by· court-martia,J.
Some of the acts for Ireland were most vigorous,182 but they
were not so far reaching as the Defence of the Realm acts. However the rebellions or insurrections in Ireland or the colonies, and the
measures resulting, ·do not afford a parallel to .the existing legal
-conditions in -Great Britain. And it might be noted somewhat parenthetically that Irish and colonial commotions have often been regarded ·by Englishmen as in a case by themsel\l'es, and not bearing
m The Habeas Corpua Act was again suspended, the legislations of 1795 and· 1799
were renewed and extended, and later by the! "Six Acts" of 1819, a detailed legislative
11rogram of repression was established.
m The Crown Colonies "msy be dealt with, legislatively and authoritatively, as the
sovereign msy please." R. v. Nelson and Brand, Cockburn's Report, II.
1Jt See R. v. Nelson and Brand, Cockburn's Report, 47·57; Clode, Military Forces
.of the Crown, II, 1'68-179. In a settled colony "the inhabitants have all the rights of
Englishmen. They take with them, in the first place, that which no Englishman can by
expatriation put off-namely, allegiance to the Crown, the duty of obedience to the
lawful co=ands of the Sovereign, and obedience to the laws which Parliament msy
think proper to make with reference to such a colony. Bnt on the other hand they
take with··them all the rights and liberties as against the prerogative of the Crown
which they would eujoy in this country." Chief Justice Cockburn in R. v. Nelson and
Brand, Cockburn's Report, II, and sec pp. 65, 66; R. v. Eyre, Fiulason's Report,· 62.
See the "Circular Dispatch to Colonial Governors" of 1867, which is of special significance in that it followed close upon the famous Jamaica cases; the dispatch is printed
.at length in Clede, op. cit., II, 666, and in part in Forsyth, Cases and Opinions in
Cons. I,aw, 214
:m If actual bombard.meut from ses and sky could be deemed ~vasion-an idea that
at least one of the judges in the Petition of Right case seems to glimpse, [I915] 3
X. B. 649-11ome interesting legal questions would be raised.
m See 43 Geo. III., c. II?; 3 & 4 Wm. IV., c. 4-
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decisively upon constitutional practice in England.133 In this we have
the paradox of two peoples subject to the same law but, as it were,
not affected by the same precedents-a generalization which of cou.rse
must escape all legal logic.
·

v.
DETERMINING PRINCIPI,$.

In attempting to arrive at the determining principles in thii;
matter, and so at a more perfect understanding of the judgment
which English statesmen have already passed on the Defence of the
Realm legislation,-the judgment that it has broken with the traditions of the constitution and so has changed it-the following have
been the outstanding considerations:I. Such action as is authorized by this legislation would not
be in accord with the common law unless, being in exercise of the
prerogative or common right, it was necessary.
2. The necessity which would justify like action by the Executive or individuals did not exist in this case. The spokesmen of
government admitted that even its purely legislative action for 1914
went beyond what was necessary. It implied furthermore that the
law as amended in 1915 went further than was necessary.
· 3. These principles are. established by an overwhelming weight
of authority, legal, political and historical. Mere expectancy of
danger does not, according to these authorities; waQCl.Ilt the concomitants of martial ·1aw. The danger must be real and pressing.
4- · Parliament hitherto has never in England, or perhaps out of
it, where the constitution e~tends, granted comparable authority to
the Executive or assumed it itself.
. . 5. In granting this authority it made legal the promulgation of
rules and the establishment of tribunals which, if the Executive
fuJly employed this power, could reduce the rights of the individual
to the vanishing point.
6. Though the sovereignty of the British nation is organized in
Parliament and it may thus pass any law, the nature of that law
as a change in the constitution or as a mere .statute is determined
entirely by its .content. If it effects a fundamental change in the
organic structure of the government or in the rights of the subject
it changes or at least suspends the constitution.
=See R. v. Nelson and Brand, Cockbnm's Report, 48, .49; Dicey, I,aw of the
Cons., 546, with its hints that the Marais case may have one meaning in England,
another in the colonies. Dut see the remarks by Sir John Scott in Ency. Britannica.
Vol. 27, 791.
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7. The recognized rights of the subject have been regarded as
fundamental limitations upon the "war power," as exercised by the
Crown and Parliament. To change these fundamental limitations
is to change the constitution.
It is of course true that the restraint with which the Executive has
exercised its powers under the emergency legislation must be weighed.
if its sigriificance is to be accurately appraised. Thougli martial law
and arbitrary· power have been authorized through a wide range of.
action they have probably affected the normal administration of
justice in no very marked degree. The courts have been in general
·· operation.
·
The ordinary law is still in force. Most offenders are and have
been tried by the civil courts. A regime of em~rgency government
or martial law in England does not now, and perhaps never will,
mean the complete substitution of military for civil rule, unless a
large part of the British Isles should become the theatre of actual
war. If that sh:ould happen martial law, which is but an instrument of the civil authority, would easily merge into military law
under which the civil. authoritJ. so far as it acts at all acts as the
licensee of the military.
Moreover due weight must be attached to the popular acceptance
of this legislation. It seems to have been ratified by a public opinion
of exceptional solidarity. And :finally the very fullest acknowledgement must be made of the crucial nature of the test to which the
British empire has been put, a life and death struggle in the opinion
of many or most of its people. The acceptance·of this legislation is
but one manifestation of that spirit which as last came to its _full
fruition in the widespread British ·approval of universal military
service.
.
With due regard toithese and other considerations which "stam]:\
the times, the outlines of this legislation are ndt much softened.
They stand out sharp against the past. A precedent has been established. And such precedents are not unlikely to be followed. The
precedents of 1795 and 1799 by which the popular con~titution was
suspended were followed no later than 1819. The precedent by
which the Habeas Corpus Act was first suspended184 by Parliament
has been often repeated.135 Is the era of international wars at an
end? With the development of science and invention will the Eng1H On the true effect oI the so-called "suspension" see Dicey, Law of the Cons.,
7th ed., 226,
I
111 The frequency of these suspension acts is largely explained by the fact that
they are annual acts. Every such act, if it is to continue in force, must be renewed
each year. Dicey, op. cit., 226.
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land of the future be more, or less, proof against invasion than the
England of today?
·
Whatever be the quality and degree of this change in the constitution of Great Britain, few may doubt that history will confirm
its wisdom so far as this great emergency was concerned. The
future must account for itself. Strong action, a complete mastery
of the situation, was the first need of that critical moment
when the war broke out. The government instinctively felt
that England would be called upon to make exertions such
as England had never made before. Never had there been
greater dang~r of ultimate invasion. The possible terrors of
sea and sky were as yet a sealed book. Foresightedness, the display
of conscious strength, proof that weakness was not in the government's make-up, these things were essential if confidence, at best a
plant of none too rapid growth, was to be developed. And confidence was the absolute prerequisite of a nation-wide sympathetic
understanding and support. The government played its part with
such skill that it proved able to move rapidly from one extreme
request to another.138 If much had not been asked by it, and at the
very beginning, would much have been given to it?
HAROLD M. BOWMAN.
Bost~n, Mass.
:IM "In Parliamentary matters the government have at each step taken the country
with them. The most obvious illustration arises from tho Military Service Acts. • • •
Those who would have h1ced compulsio~ a year ago would have had it with convulsions
and national turmoil which would have spoiled its value. At every stage in this controversy; so far as it is possible to ascertain the main current, not only of national
opinion but of national desire, the government has neith~ gone aho:ad of, nor lagged
behind, the real national will. • • • Restrictions _upon trade, the increase of taxation,
the tightening of Regulations for National Defence, can only be efficacious in a country
like onrs when they come about at the earliest moment at which the nation is ready
to receive them and the situation demands them. Those who will contend that these
things have been done too late or too early have the burden of proof upon them, and
one does not know where to look. to find that burden discharged." Sir W. R. Adkin1,
M. P., in the Contemporary Review, June, 2916, 681 at 685.

